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Abstract 
This paper draws a link between Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s allegory 
of the cave and his support for the National Socialist regime during the 
early 30’s. Three interrelated suggestions are made: (1) That Heidegger’s 
reading of the allegory of the cave is informed by his preoccupation with 
the imminent threat of nihilism. (2) That Heidegger’s interpretation radi-
calizes his critique of the public sphere to the effect that it renders the lat-
ter irredeemable. (3) That the unbridgeable gap between philosophy and 
the public sphere commits Heidegger to the anticipation of a catastrophic 
event that will open up the possibility of genuine freedom.  
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between Heidegger and Plato is a topic that has at-
tracted a fair amount of interest in philosophical scholarship. The earli-
est comment on such a relationship comes from Paul Friedländer’s cri-
tique of Heidegger’s assertion that Plato transformed the notion of truth 
from unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) to correctness (Richtigkeit).1 
This last point, which constitutes the central claim of Heidegger’s 1942 
essay on Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, has been challenged by numerous 
                                           
1 Paul Friedländer, Plato: An Introduction, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (New York: 
Harper, 1964). 
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scholars who have worked on the relationship between Plato and Hei-
degger. Notwithstanding their differences, Stanley Rosen,2 Robert Dos-
tal,3 and more recently Francesco Gonzalez,4 agree that Heidegger 
downgrades the ontological insights of Plato’s philosophy and focuses 
only on the epistemological ones, which he happens to criticize.  
Robert Dostal locates a tension between Heidegger’s remarks about 
Plato’s epekeina tes ousias in his early Marburg lectures and in his 1942 
essay on Plato’s Doctrine of Truth. Whereas in the Marburg lectures 
Plato’s suggestion that Being is epekeina tes ousias is understood by Hei-
degger as pointing in the direction of a genuine encounter with Being as 
such, in his 1942 essay Plato’s phrase is absent. According to Dostal, this 
absence is indicative of Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato as the father of 
epistemology and the metaphysics of subjectivity.5 Dostal’s argument for 
the downgrading of the ontological in Plato is correct as far as the 1942 
essay goes. There is, however, an assumption underlying Dostal’s account 
that does not do justice to the complexity of Heidegger’s relation to Plato. 
Dostal assumes that the 1942 essay on Plato’s Doctrine of Truth repeats 
and summarizes the main points made by Heidegger in his 1931-32 and 
1933-34 lectures devoted in Plato’s allegory of the cave.  
This assumption has been rightfully challenged by Gonzalez who 
suggests that Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato in the early 30’s un-
dermines the main thesis of the 1942 essay.6 Following Gonzalez’s ob-
servation, this paper contends that Heidegger’s texts from the early 30’s 
are much more open to the ontological insights of Plato’s philosophy 
than the 1942 essay. Contrary to Gonzalez, however, special attention is 
                                           
2 Stanley Rosen, Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay (London: Yale University 
Press, 1969), 144-145. See also The Question of Being: A Reversal of Heidegger 
(Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002), 4 ff. 
3 Robert Dostal, “Beyond Being: Heidegger’s Plato.” In Martin Heidegger: 
Critical Assessments, vol. 2, ed. Christopher E. Maccan (New York: Routledge, 
1992), 61-89.  
4 Francisco Gonzalez, Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue (Pennsyl-
vania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009).  
5 Dostal, “Beyond Being: Heidegger’s Plato,” 73-74. 
6 Gonzalez pays attention to the fact that in his 1931-32 and 1933-34 courses on 
Plato, Heidegger does not insist on the transformation of the essence of truth in 
the way that he insists on the 1942 essay on “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” (see 
Gonzalez, Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue, 112).  
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paid to Heidegger’s ontological reading of the allegory of the cave and 
to how it serves the purpose of saying something about nihilism — the 
forgetfulness of Being — and the prospect of overcoming it.  
The aim of this paper is to explore the political implications of Hei-
degger’s determination to read the allegory of the cave as a story about the 
history of human essence. The Platonic resonance of Heidegger’s political 
allegiance to National Socialism is neatly expressed in the “back from 
Syracuse?” greeting addressed to Heidegger by one of his Freiburg col-
leagues and quoted by Gadamer in his homonymous article.7 Nevertheless, 
not enough attention has been paid to the relationship between Heidegger’s 
appropriation of Plato’s allegory of the cave during the early 30’s and his 
allegiance to National Socialism. This paper tries to make this relationship 
explicit by focusing on Heidegger’s interpretation of the allegory as a story 
about human essence (Wesen) and the occurrence (Geschehen) of historical 
existence. Three interrelated suggestions are made: (1) That Heidegger’s 
reading of the allegory of the cave is informed by his preoccupation with 
the imminent threat of nihilism, (2) that Heidegger’s interpretation radical-
izes his critique of the public sphere to the effect that it renders it irredeem-
able, and (3) that the unbridgeable gap between philosophy and the public 
sphere commits Heidegger to the anticipation of a catastrophic event that 
will open up the possibility of genuine freedom. 
2. The Destiny of Being as Nihilism 
In Heidegger on Being and Acting, Reiner Schürmann breaks down 
Heidegger’s œuvre in three periods, each of which corresponds to a 
transformation of transcendental phenomenology. According to Schür-
mann’s arrangement, the first stage of Heidegger’s thought marks the 
transition from transcendental phenomenology to existential phenome-
nology. With this transition “the condition of our knowing and experi-
encing is no longer sought purely in man, but in his relation to the being 
of entities in their totality.”8 The second transformation consists in the 
passage from the preeminence of Dasein to Menschentum, inaugurated 
                                           
7 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Back from Syracuse?” trans. John McCumber, Critical 
Inquiry, vol. 15, n. 2 (1989), 427-30. 
8 Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to 
Anarchy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 69. 
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by the “discovery” of destinal history. Such a transformation indicates 
that it is not Dasein that “opens up a clearing,” but that it is rather his-
torical aletheia that constitutes human beings by situating them in a par-
ticular epoch of the destiny of Being.9 Finally, the third transformation is 
that from humanity (Menschentum) to thinking (Denken). During this 
period, Heidegger suggests that the task of thinking is that of letting be-
ings reveal themselves without manipulating them.10  
In what follows, I argue that Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s allegory 
of the cave during the early 30’s constitutes an early expression of Hei-
degger’s shift from Dasein to the destiny of Being. Contrary to Schür-
mann, however, I suggest that the transition from Dasein to the destiny of 
Being — at least in its early formulation — reveals Heidegger’s preoccu-
pation with an existential threat that Western humanity encounters, 
namely the threat of nihilism.11 Heidegger’s first explicit reference to ni-
hilism occurs in his 1935 lecture course published in 1953 under the title 
Introduction to Metaphysics. There, Heidegger describes nihilism as the 
cultivation of beings “in the forgetfulness of being.”12 Although he will 
not use the word “nihilism” before 1935, Heidegger had already been de-
veloping a diagnosis of imminent nihilism since 1931. This becomes ap-
parent, in the “preliminary considerations” of his 1931-32 lecture course 
The Essence of Truth. Notwithstanding the fact that the explicit aim of the 
course is to “consider the essence of truth” by going back to Plato’s alle-
gory, Heidegger insists that the return to the originary Greek experience of 
truth as aletheia is prescribed to us by the demands of the day.13  
                                           
9 Ibid., 73. 
10 Ibid., 76. 
11 Schürmann’s suggestion is that, with the transition from Dasein to Menschen-
tum, Heidegger’s thought shatters linear time and touches upon a historical a 
priori that is radically discontinuous and anarchic. Although I am sympathetic to 
such a reading of Heidegger’s late writings, it seems to me that the transforma-
tion from Dasein to Menschentum is not as straightforward as Schürmann pre-
sents it to be. This is to say that during the early 30’s Heidegger develops a nar-
rative that renders Being and/or its forgetfulness an ultimate principle of cohe-
sion that determines all possible praxis. 
12 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Rich-
ard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 217. 
13 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and 
Theaetetus, trans. Ted Sadler (London, Continuum, 2009), 1-5. 
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Heidegger does not go on to work out in full detail what the 
demands of the day are. He does, however, indicate that the allegory of 
the cave is a story about the awakening of the historical essence of hu-
man existence, which is at the present suffocated.14 As it is well known, 
Heidegger has a peculiar understanding of the words “essence” and “ex-
istence.” Already in Being and Time, he suggests that “the ‘essence’ of 
Dasein lies in existence.”15 One has to be attentive to the fact that Hei-
degger puts the word “essence” in inverted commas, thus expressing his 
discomfort with this philosophically laden term. Heidegger’s determina-
tion to challenge the traditional understanding of essence as essentia be-
comes clearer when one focuses on his understanding of existence. Exis-
tence for Heidegger is irreducible to mere presence; it is not something 
that all beings share. “Existence” is a term that Heidegger reserves for 
human beings only, as it names an ek-stasis, i.e., the stepping out of 
oneself toward Being. When Heidegger suggests, therefore, that human 
essence is at the present suffocated, what he is tacitly saying is that hu-
man existence — qua ek-stasis — is under threat.  
The underlying danger necessitating a return to Greek thinking 
comes to a sharper relief in Heidegger’s 1932 summer course The 
Beginning of Western Philosophy. In the second part of this course, enti-
tled “Interposed Considerations,” he attempts to give a more elaborate 
justification of the need to go back to the Greeks. He does so by drawing 
an analogy between the current state of humanity and a wanderer in an 
arid land who is about to die from thirst due to her distance from the 
source that she last drew water from.16  
To better understand the implications of Heidegger’s story of the 
wanderer, one must first examine what he means by the threat of dying 
from thirst. As we have indicated, the wanderer symbolizes humanity.17 
                                           
14 Ibid., 45, 59. 
15 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robin-
son (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 68. 
16 Martin Heidegger, The Beginning of Western Philosophy, trans. Richard Rojce-
wicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 31 f.  
17 Heidegger’s story of the wanderer deserves further examination, especially in 
relation to the contemptible comments that he makes about Judaism in his Black 
Notebooks. Is Heidegger appropriating here the stereotype of the wandering and 
rootless Jew? And how does this relate to his comments about the worldlessness 
of Judaism that we find in the Black Notebooks? (See Heidegger, Ponderings 
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But Heidegger is not saying that humanity — as a species — faces the 
threat of natural extinction. His suggestion rather amounts to the claim 
that humanity is in the process of forfeiting its transcendence toward Be-
ing and that, in this way, it is exhausting the resources of its freedom. 
By that time, Heidegger has developed a sense of freedom that goes 
hand in hand with the human openness to Being. Genuine “becoming 
free” amounts to a projective understanding of Being which nevertheless 
supposes a binding relationship to “what gives freedom,” namely the 
enigma that lies at the very heart of the question of Being.18 Freedom for 
Heidegger is a gift of Being to human beings. It is the mystery of Being 
that opens up the space for human freedom.  
At this point, I should make clear that, according to my reading, 
during the early 30’s Heidegger’s thought takes the opposite path from 
the one suggested by Simon Critchley. Whereas Critchley calls for the 
need to focus on Dasein’s thrownness and facticity, I contend that dur-
ing the early 30’s Heidegger prioritizes Dasein’s transcendence.19 “The 
                                                                                         
VII-XI, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017, 
76). These are questions that I examine in another paper and cannot adequately 
develop here. For the purpose of this paper, it suffices to say that it is indeed 
highly possible that Heidegger appropriates the anti-Semitic stereotype of the 
rootless Jew with the purpose of alerting his audience to the disastrous implica-
tions of the increased distance from the question of Being. Having said this, 
however, it is important to note that the wanderer that he describes in the 1932 
summer course symbolizes not a rootless and worldless wanderer — the type of 
existence that Heidegger ascribes to the Jewish figure in the Black Notebooks — 
but a wanderer who remains rooted to the source, even when he has lost his ori-
entation (Heidegger, The Beginning of Western Philosophy, 31). With the story 
of the wanderer, Heidegger seeks to say something about the predicament of 
Western Dasein. The closer Western Dasein comes to dying of thirst, the closer 
it comes to realizing its rootedness to the question of Being. The ostensible root-
lessness of Western humanity derives from its originary relation to Being.  
18 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 43. 
19 Critchley suggests that one should focus on Heidegger’s account of thrownness 
and facticity, so as to rescue Heidegger’s thought from a heroism that accentuates 
his disregard for the plurality of human-being together (see Simon Critchley and 
Reiner Schürmann, On Heidegger’s Being and Time, ed. Steven Levine, London: 
Routledge, 2018, 139 ff). By suggesting that Heidegger prioritizes transcendence, I 
am not claiming that he abandons his account of thrownness. As a matter of fact, 
the story of the wanderer indicates that the wanderer is thrown in his predicament 
— the forgetfulness of Being. What is rather being suggested here is that Heideg-
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essence [die Essenz] of humans consists in their existence. And this their 
essence is possible on the basis of transcendence.”20  
If my reading is correct, Heidegger’s reference to the peril of death 
relates to his sense of existence as a stepping out of oneself toward be-
ings as a whole, which in turn implies a transcendence toward the ques-
tion of Being as such. The peril of death marks, therefore, the peril of 
non-existence, provided, however, that we do not identify existence 
(Existenz) with actuality (Wircklichkeit).21 Heidegger links the danger of 
non-existence to the distance of Western Dasein from the spring that 
made this existence possible in the first place.22 The existence of West-
ern Dasein is grounded in the occurrence of an understanding of Being, 
which in turn implies a transcendence toward the mystery of Being. 
Heidegger calls this process the esteeming (das Würdigen) of Being.23 
Without Dasein’s transcendence toward the mystery of Being, there is 
no understanding of Being and, without an understanding of Being, no 
comportment to beings, not even to ourselves as beings.24 This esteem-
ing of Being that, according to Heidegger, occurs for the first time in 
                                                                                         
ger’s early thoughts on the destiny of Being are preoccupied with the danger of 
forfeiting transcendence. If transcendence is forfeited, then thrownness is forfeited, 
too. This is to say that with the suffocation of human existence, the thrown situat-
edness of Western humanity is not understood as the inevitable result of the self-
withdrawal of Being, but rather transforms itself into reality and actuality. In other 
words, without transcendence thrownness is not understood as thrownness. 
20 Heidegger, The Beginning of Western Philosophy, 69. 
21 Ibid., 62. In his eagerness to determine the peculiar nature of existence and how 
it is at stake in the era of nihilism, Heidegger feels the need to draw a distinction 
between mere human actuality, on the one hand, and human existence on the 
other. Existence, he says, “signifies the mode of Being of humans.” He contin-
ues, however, to say that existence does not apply to humans in general and as 
such: “Not all humans who are actual, were actual, or will be actual do ‘exist,’ 
have existed, or will exist — in the sense we understand existence” (ibid., 64). 
22 The word that could best describe this danger is the word “nihilism.” Heidegger 
does not use this word in his 1932 lecture, but he devotes a section of his semi-
nar to “the determination of the current situation by Friedrich Nietzsche,” thus 
introducing the idea that the true meaning of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism 
relates to the danger of non-existence (ibid., 35).  
23 Ibid., 59. 
24 Martin Heidegger, Being and Truth, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 122.  
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early Greek thinking, marks for him the transformation of human exis-
tence from mere actuality to being-in-a-world and historicality.25 To put 
this last point differently, it is with the esteeming of Being that worldli-
ness and historical existence happen. From this it follows that with the 
dis-esteeming/the forgetfulness of Being both of them are in danger.  
Heidegger seems convinced that his time is one of high stakes, be-
cause Western Dasein has alienated itself from the questioning of Being 
to such an extent that it encounters the danger of plunging itself in a pet-
rified reality (status quo) where there are no other possibilities apart 
from the ones available.26 This is how Heidegger describes nihilism in 
Introduction to Metaphysics:  
But where is the real nihilism at work? Where one clings to current beings 
and believes it is enough to take beings, as before, just as the beings that 
they are. But with this, one rejects the question of Being and treats Being 
as a nothing (nihil), which in a certain way it even “is,” insofar as it essen-
tially unfolds. Merely to chase after beings in the midst of the oblivion of 
Being — that is nihilism. Nihilism thus understood is the ground for the 
nihilism that Nietzsche exposed in the first book of The Will to Power.27  
The crucial elements of the above passage are: (1) Heidegger’s re-
mark that nihilism is at work when thinking clings to the familiar and 
treats Being as such (the unfamiliar) as nothing at all, (2) Heidegger’s 
claim that Being in its essential unfolding “is” nothing, yet not nothing 
at all. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s claim that Being is the emp-
tiest of all concepts and therefore nothing at all is quite informative in 
revealing the oblivion of Being in modern thinking. This oblivion, how-
ever, is for Heidegger the culminating point of the spiritual decline of 
the West.28 Much like in his story of the wanderer, decline is the result 
of a distancing from the source of our history.  
In front of such a danger, Heidegger appeals to an understanding of 
existence in terms of a transcendence from that which is most familiar 
                                           
25 It is in his 1930 essay “On the Essence of Truth,” that Heidegger explicitly 
draws a link between the beginning of Western Dasein’s historicality and the 
Greek understanding of Being as physis (see Heidegger, Pathmarks, trans. Wil-
liam McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 145).  
26 Heidegger, The Beginning of Western Philosophy, 60. 
27 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 217. 
28 Ibid., 29. 
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(beings) to what is the most unfamiliar (Being). So, what is at stake here 
is not only a concealment of the essence of truth as unconcealment, but 
most importantly the concealment of human essence as existence. The 
threat of perishing signals the threat of plunging ourselves in an eternal 
in-sistence. Going back to his 1931-32 course on Plato, Heidegger ex-
plicitly states that, without experiencing this threat, the return to Plato’s 
allegory of the cave is merely a façade.29 If my reading is correct, it is 
the threat of nihilism that functions as the access point for understanding 
Heidegger’s appropriation of the allegory. Having established that the 
demands of the day have something to do with the danger of non-
existence, we can now move to the second part of this paper and exam-
ine how Heidegger molds Plato’s allegory in a way that fits his account 
of nihilism.  
3. The Four Stages of the Allegory of the Cave 
Both in the lecture course of the winter semester of 1931-32 and that of 
the winter semester of 1933-34, Heidegger breaks down the allegory 
into four stages: (1) The situation of human beings in the cave; (2) the 
failed liberation within the cave; (3) the genuine liberation outside the 
cave; (4) the return of the liberated philosopher into the cave as a libera-
tor. In the following, I provide a succinct reading of each stage, paying 
special attention to the transition from the first stage to the third one. I 
suggest that Heidegger appropriates the allegory of the cave in a way 
that raises to irreconcilable heights the tension between the first and the 
third stage. In doing so, I argue, Heidegger finds himself in need of a 
catastrophic event that will open up the possibility for genuine freedom.  
3.1. The First Stage 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the first stage of the allegory resembles his 
account of everydayness (Alltäglichkeit), fallenness (Verfallen), and 
inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) in Being and Time.30 As Heidegger says, 
“the allegory depicts precisely the everyday situation of man, who, in so 
far as he does not possess any standard other than everydayness, cannot 
                                           
29 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 13. 
30 Heidegger, Being and Time, 219 ff. 
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see its strangeness.”31 The shackled prisoners of the allegory are im-
mersed in a world, they comport themselves toward inner-worldly beings, 
but they are unaware of the world and of their being-in-the-world (In-der-
Welt-sein). In other words, the prisoners are unaware of this modality of 
being that distinguishes human beings from stones, plants, and animals.32 
Unawareness, however, does not imply complete absence of a world. This 
becomes clear in Heidegger’s claim that the cave dwellers relate to the es-
sence of truth as un-hiddenness (Unverborgenheit), which means that the 
cave dwellers are already riveted to an un-hiddenness of Being — an im-
plicit understanding of Being — that makes beings intelligible. It is the 
world that solicits their actions, and yet, they remain unaware of it. Like in 
Being and Time, Heidegger’s interpretation of the first stage of the alle-
gory suggests that human beings have the tendency of becoming absorbed 
in the world, and “Being-lost in the publicness of the ‘they’.”33 “The pris-
oners do not even know that they are in a ‘situation’.”34 
It is important, however, to remain alert to two important differ-
ences between Heidegger’s account of everydayness in Being and Time 
and its tacit re-examination in the early 30’s. One thing to bear in mind 
is that Heidegger’s later remarks about everydayness are informed by 
the first steps that his thinking takes toward the history of Being 
(Seinsgeschichte).35 This means that the situation of the cave dwellers is 
not interpreted merely as a manifestation of the existential tendency of 
Dasein toward falling. The situation of the cave dwellers is rather inter-
preted as revealing something about the situatedness of human beings in 
a particular epoch of the history of Being — the era of imminent nihil-
ism. The second point that demands our attention is that Heidegger’s fo-
cus shifts from Dasein (singular) to Menschentum and Western human-
                                           
31 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 22. 
32 For a discussion of the difference between stones, plants, animals, and human 
beings with regard to the world, see Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and 
Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 178. See also 
Heidegger, Being and Truth, 137. 
33 Heidegger, Being and Time, 220. 
34 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 23. 
35 Heidegger uses this term for the first time in Contributions to Philosophy. How-
ever, one already finds traces of it in his lecture courses of the early 30’s. One 
such example is the use of the archaic Seyn instead of Sein.  
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ity in general. Heidegger is no longer interested in highlighting falling as 
an existential characteristic of Dasein. He is rather determined to exam-
ine how this characteristic deploys itself in an era when Western human-
ity has been the furthest removed from the question of Being. As Mi-
chael Inwood puts it, the allegory of the cave is for Heidegger a story 
that helps us “comprehend ourselves in our ownmost Geschichte.”36  
The aforementioned differences set a different tone to Heidegger’s 
reading of everydayness. In the context of his analysis of the allegory of 
the cave, Heidegger is not aiming at disclosing Dasein as falling and 
thrown projection, but rather at showing how humanity can regain its 
ek-sistence by re-appropriating the question of Being. In other words, 
existence and transcendence become more important than thrownness 
and facticity, which is not to say that the latter become irrelevant.37 Seen 
from the perspective of imminent nihilism, the first stage of the allegory 
touches upon the issue of a collective falling of Western humanity. In 
such a forgetful falling, Western humanity treats the present as immedi-
ately and unquestionably true.  
During the early 30’s, Heidegger understands the task of thinking 
as that of excavating the hitherto unquestioned ground of the world that 
we live in. Although Being and Time, as Carman suggests, can be read 
as a work that explores the possibility of “taking up a new, distinctive 
                                           
36 Michael Inwood, “Truth and Untruth in Plato and Heidegger.” In Heidegger and 
Plato: Toward Dialogue, ed. Catalin Partenie and Tom Rockmore (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2005), 87. In the introductory comments of his 
lecture course, Heidegger talks about the significance of a historical orientation 
to thinking, i.e., the significance of examining the buried tradition in which our 
present situation stands: “what is current today is confirmed as itself ancient” 
(Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 7). 
37 What Heidegger has in mind becomes clearer in his interpretation of Parmenides 
in Introduction to Metaphysics, wherein he draws a link between the Greek 
word doxa and the realm of das Man. Heidegger insists that the Greeks experi-
enced the path of doxa as unavoidable. What is important, however, is that the 
Greeks recognized doxa as an unavoidable path on the grounds of their experi-
ence of “the sweeping storm on the way of Being” and “the terror of the second 
way to the abyss of Nothing” (Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 120). It 
is this experience that made the Greeks reluctant to take what appears as unques-
tionably true, and it is the distance from this experience that has transformed 
Western Dasein into a being that is satisfied with what is readily available and 
familiar. 
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relation to the social norms always already governing one’s concrete 
possibilities,”38 in the early 30’s Heidegger’s tone becomes increasingly 
alarmist. He finds no true liberating potential in the concrete possibili-
ties of Western humanity. It is only by achieving a distance from what is 
unquestionably familiar that genuine historical thinking is enacted. And 
it is only in such an enactment that an authentic futurity opens up.39  
Going back to what was said above about Heidegger’s peculiar un-
derstanding of existence, the prisoners at the first stage of the allegory 
are on the verge of non-existence, since they are alienated not only from 
their own worldliness (Weltlichkeit) but most importantly from their 
forgetfulness of the transcendence toward the clearing (Lichtung) of Be-
ing that grounds both their Being-in-the-world (ontological truth) and 
the availability of beings for ontic comportment (ontic truth).40 If my 
reading is correct, the prisoners of the first stage symbolize Western 
Dasein, which is caught at the culminating point of nihilism, i.e., in an 
epoch in which Being reveals itself as irrelevant, void, not-question-
worthy.  
3.2. The Second Stage  
The second stage of the allegory is the least commented by Heidegger. 
But, as I hope to show in this paper, it is far from being the least signifi-
cant. The second stage of the allegory marks, for Heidegger, a sudden 
                                           
38 Taylor Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and 
Authenticity in Being and Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
143. 
39 “For in genuine historical reflection we take just that distance from the present 
which allows us room to leap out beyond our own present, i.e. to treat it just as 
every present as present deserves to be treated, namely as something to be 
overcome. Genuine historical return is the decisive beginning of authentic futu-
rity” (Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 7). 
40 The word Licthung is used for the first time in the 1930 essay “On the Essence 
of Truth.” The important element introduced by this essay is the claim that un-
truth (concealment) is not the result of human limitation, but rather stems from 
the concealing essence of truth as such. Heidegger uses the word “mystery” to 
describe the originary concealment that belongs to truth as such (see Heidegger, 
Pathmarks, 146 ff). With such a claim, Heidegger anticipates his turn from the 
concealing unconcealment of Dasein to the concealing unconcealment of Being 
as such. 
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event whereby one or some of the prisoners turn away from what has 
been readily familiar. Two important things happen at the second stage. 
First, the realization that truth has gradations, i.e., that things can be 
more or less unconcealed.41 Second, an implicit announcement of the 
difference between Being and beings.42 This later announcement carries 
with it the possibility of coming to the realization of the distinctive es-
sence of human existence, namely, that human beings are more beingful 
(seiender) beings, because they are exposed to beings as a whole.43 It is, 
however, the failure of the liberated prisoners to dig deeper into the 
question of Being and aletheia that constitutes the missed chance and, 
thus, the failure of the second stage.  
The liberation of the second stage is sudden and unsettling. It causes 
insecurity and confusion and it prompts the liberated prisoners to the secu-
rity and complacency of their imprisoned state. The liberated prisoner 
wants to return to a place “where no exertion is required, where he is un-
hindered, where nothing recoils upon him, where there is no confusion, 
and where everyone is in agreement.”44 In doing so, the prisoner flees 
from decision and fails “to stand in the ground of his essence.”45 But what 
does it mean for someone to stand on the ground of their essence? Hei-
degger’s answer is that it is to engage in an enactment of the ontological 
difference. This last point gives us a hint that Heidegger’s concern is not 
reducible to a desire to reach an ontological clarification of the difference 
between Being and beings. The failure of the second stage resides pre-
cisely in this lack of enactment: “the difference occurs in the enactment of 
the differentiation. To bring the differentiation to enactment would be be-
ing-human [Menschsein], existing [Existieren].”46 So, existence is not 
achieved in the second stage. The liberated prisoner turns a deaf ear to the 
implicit announcement of the ontological difference and goes back to her 
insistent comportment toward beings.  
At this point, it is worth mentioning a new element introduced by 
                                           
41 “Truth and truth is not simply the same” (Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 25). 
42 With their release, the prisoners have the chance to see what is closer to Being 
(έγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος). 
43 See Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 25 and Heidegger, Being and Truth, 137. 
44 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 27. 
45 Ibid., 28. 
46 Ibid., 28. 
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Heidegger’s 1933-34 reading of the allegory. Whereas both in the 1931-
32 and the 1933-34 lecture course he insists that the prisoners of the 
second stage are not liberated to their true essence, in the latter he sug-
gests that something happens in the second stage — “History 
[Geschichte] begins.”47 This is a crucial point to bear in mind, since it 
makes a significant difference on how we read the second stage of the 
allegory. If nothing but failure happens there, then the second stage is 
unnecessary for the occurrence of genuine liberation. If, nevertheless, 
history begins at the second stage, then notwithstanding the possibility 
of failure, the insecurity and confusion described at the second stage is 
not an arbitrary event, but rather a positive event toward the realization 
of existence proper.48 I submit that, during the early 30’s, Heidegger 
does indeed consider the confusion found at the second stage of the alle-
gory as a necessary step toward genuine freedom. But I will develop this 
point in my discussion of the fourth stage of the allegory. Before doing 
so, however, it is necessary to say a few things about Heidegger’s con-
ception of true freedom, as deployed in his reading of the third stage of 
the allegory.  
3.3. The Third Stage 
Heidegger’s understanding of genuine liberation is clarified in his dis-
cussion of the third stage of the allegory. Although his analysis of the 
third stage is quite elaborate and I cannot do justice to it in details, for 
the purpose of this paper I limit myself to highlighting three important 
features. First, Heidegger insists that the liberation that occurs at the 
third stage is not an easy one, since it requires a violent abandonment of 
what is readily familiar and an exposure to what is most unfamiliar.49 
Second, he makes clear that genuine freedom takes place in the act of 
de-concealing (Ent-bergen).50 Deconcealment (Entborgung) is presented 
by Heidegger as a pre-modelling (vorbildlich) projection of Being that 
“first allows us to come closer to beings.”51 Third, he claims that the 
                                           
47 Heidegger, Being and Truth, 108 
48 Ibid. 
49 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 32. 
50 Ibid., 53. 
51 Ibid., 45. Deconcealment is a fundamental act of human beings in the sense that 
it grounds the manifestedness of beings (see, Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 
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most genuine modality of de-concealing — namely, the de-concealing 
that at once reveals and transforms human essence — is the de-
concealing occurring within the questioning stance of philosophy.52  
During the early 30’s, Heidegger presents Plato as a transitional 
thinker who is, on the one hand, riveted to the primordial experience of 
truth as the interplay of concealment and unconcealment and, on the 
other hand, expresses the forgetfulness of fundamental concealment in 
treating untruth as pseudos. Heidegger rejects those interpretations that 
treat Platonic ideas as objective beings or categories of thinking.53 His 
interpretation aims to distance itself from an understanding of ideas as 
quidditas, i.e., as static concepts that reveal the “whatness” or “the es-
sential nature” of a thing. To be more precise, Heidegger attempts to put 
forward an interpretation of the meaning of the word idea that links it to 
what he called pre-ontological truth in his essay On the Essence of 
Ground. This pre-ontological truth is the unconcealment of Being that is 
irreducible to categories of theoretical thinking.54 In other words, Hei-
degger suggests that the Platonic term idea points to the pre-ontological 
understanding of Being that “guides and illuminates in advance all com-
portment toward beings.”55  
According to Heidegger, the Platonic idea reveals something es-
sential about the Being of beings, namely, that beings in their Being 
come to presence by entering into a form — an idea: “The seeing of the 
idea, i.e. the understanding of what-being and how-being, in short of 
being, first allows beings to be recognized as the beings they are.”56 The 
idea constitutes the Being of beings in the sense that it provides the im-
plicit criterion for distinguishing between beings and non-beings.  
As for the Platonic Good (agathon), Heidegger explicitly states 
that it has no moral significance for Plato and that it is thus not to be un-
derstood as value.57 Here, it must be mentioned that Heidegger’s reading 
of the Platonic agathon in the early 30’s is much more generous than his 
                                                                                         
55, and Being and Truth, 136). 
52 The de-concealing that reveals Being as the most question-worthy. 
53 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 52. 
54 Heidegger, Pathmarks, 104. 
55 Ibid. See also Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 42.  
56 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 38-39. 
57 Ibid., 78. 
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reading of it in the 1942 essay On Plato’s Doctrine of Truth. Although 
Heidegger thinks that Plato’s description of the agathon as an idea is 
symptomatic of Plato’s confusion, his interpretation is quite generous 
since it focuses on Socrates’ saying that the agathon is beyond the Being 
of beings. In the latter remark, Heidegger finds an echo of the irreduci-
bility of the agathon to presence; he detects a struggle between the ten-
dency to reduce the agathon to an idea and a tendency to think of the 
agathon as a self-withdrawing source of presence. This is to say that 
Heidegger finds in Plato’s agathon an implicit announcement of a pri-
mordial concealment that lies at the heart of truth; a concealment that is 
irreducible to the negative conception of concealment as distortion 
caused by human beings.58 The agathon is the enabling power (duna-
mis) that is ungraspable and intangible, “almost like nothingness and the 
void.”59 He goes as far as to describe the Platonic agathon in terms of a 
clearing (Lichtung), thus allowing the agathon to be understood as the 
self-withdrawing empowering power that opens up the possibility for an 
understanding of Being.60  
Given the above, the freedom that transpires at the third stage of 
the allegory is exhausted neither in the thematization of the understand-
ing of Being that underlies ontic comportment nor in the possibility of a 
new understanding of Being. Although Heidegger identifies genuine 
human freedom with the pre-modelling projection of Being, he never-
theless suggests that the possibility of pre-modelling projection is not a 
possibility that human beings derive from their own resources. Becom-
ing free presupposes an exposure to the primordial concealment, the 
withdrawal of which allows for the occurrence of a pre-modelling pro-
jection of Being. Freedom — the possibility of a projective understand-
                                           
58 The understanding of concealment strictly in terms of distortion is for Heidegger 
an indication that concealment has fallen into forgetfulness: “Wherever the con-
cealment of beings as a whole is conceded only as a limit that occasionally an-
nounces itself, concealing as a fundamental occurrence has sunk into forgotten-
ness” (Heidegger, Pathmarks, 149). 
59 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 39. 
60 Ibid., 43. According to Heidegger, the agathon is neither a being nor that which 
unconceals beings. Whereas the idea enables an orientation towards beings, the 
agathon is the space which grants the possibility of pre-ontological understand-
ing. An inquiry into the agathon is an inquiry “into what grants being and unhi-
denness” (ibid., 79). 
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ing of Being — is a gift to human beings. In Heidegger’s own words, 
freedom “receives its own essence from the more originary essence of 
uniquely essential truth.”61 To be genuinely free, therefore, is to remain 
alert to that which gives freedom, namely the agathon, the Licthung, the 
abysmal interplay of concealment and unconcealment that lies at the 
core of the truth of Being. Freedom, he says, is measured according to 
the depth of one’s binding to what gives-free.62  
It is precisely this last point that distinguishes philosophy from 
other modalities of de-concealing/projective projection of Being. Hei-
degger gives the example of modern science as a case of pre-modelling 
projection of Being that does not sustain a binding relation to what 
gives-free. According to Heidegger, modern scientific practice is 
grounded on a projection that “delineated in advance what was hence-
forth to be understood as nature and natural process: a spatio-temporally 
determined totality of movement of masspoints.”63 But, although Hei-
degger takes modern science to be a case of human freedom, he claims 
that it remains unhinged from the source of freedom. Notwithstanding 
the fact that modern science is originally a case of freedom, its insistent 
preoccupation with beings signals the forgetting of “its original essential 
character of liberation.”64  
Contrary to the pre-modelling projection of modern science, phi-
losophy instantiates human existence in its fullest. In Heidegger’s 
words: “Only by entering into the dangerous region of philosophy is it 
possible for man to realize his nature as transcending himself into the 
unhiddenness of beings. Man apart from philosophy is something 
else.”65 So, for Heidegger, true liberation occurs only from within the 
zone of philosophy. Genuine “becoming free” amounts to a projective 
understanding of Being which nevertheless supposes a binding relation-
ship to that which gives freedom, and that which gives freedom is the 
mystery that lies at the very heart of the question of Being.  
Already since 1930, Heidegger draws a link between the emer-
gence of historical existence and the projective understanding of Being: 
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History begins only when beings themselves are expressly drawn up into 
their unconcealment and conserved in it, only when this conservation is 
conceived on the basis of questioning regarding beings as such. The origi-
nary disclosure of beings as a whole, the question concerning beings as 
such, and the beginning of Western history are the same; they occur to-
gether in a “time” which, itself unmeasurable, first opens up the open re-
gion for every measure.66  
Heidegger suggests that Western history and the historical exis-
tence of humanity begin with the question: What are beings? Such a 
question is, according to Heidegger, not to be understood as a question 
about present beings. The question itself points to the surpassing of be-
ings (Dasein’s transcendence) and the exposure to the mystery of Being 
as such. The simultaneity of the surpassing and the exposure to the mys-
tery is what provokes the question about beings: why are beings 
something instead of nothing? 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the third stage of the allegory is con-
cerned with the idea of historical existence and its inception in the ques-
tioning stance toward Being. His idiosyncratic interpretation of the alle-
gory aims at drawing a link between the inception of historical existence 
and the fundamental stance toward Being, which nevertheless presup-
poses an exposure to the nothingness of Being, i.e., to the void that rages 
at the heart of the question of all questions. Such an exposure to the 
nothingness of Being is for Heidegger what marks the transformation 
from mere actuality to historical existence.67 But this is not the only 
thing that Heidegger extracts from the allegory. The allegory tells us that 
it is only through the rekindling of a genuine confrontation with the 
mystery of Being that Western Dasein can overcome its destitution and 
                                           
66 Heidegger, Pathmarks, 145. 
67 “This beginning [the beginning of our spiritual-historical Dasein] is the setting 
out [Aufbruch] of Greek philosophy. Here, for the first time, western man raises 
himself up from a popular base and, by virtue of his language, stands up to the 
totality of what is, which he questions and conceives as the being that it is” 
(Martin Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” trans. Kar-
sten Harries in Review of Metaphysics, 1985, vol. 38, n. 3, 467-502, 471-472). 
As it will become apparent in some of his later writings, the interpretation of 
physis as upsurgent presencing allows Heidegger to claim that in the Greek ex-
perience of physis one can find an awareness of the mystery of Being (see Hei-
degger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 121). 
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regain its proper existence.68  
The key point here is that the overcoming of destitution can be 
achieved only in the act of questioning as such. Liberation, he says, is a 
matter of doing and not of talking. It is a matter of taking a standpoint 
toward Being and its limit — nothingness.69 The standpoint that Hei-
degger is talking about is, however, not a closed, dogmatic one. The 
standpoint of philosophy is one of incessant questioning and vigilance 
toward the self-withdrawal of Being. It is not a standpoint that guards it-
self against indeterminacy, but rather a standpoint that positively opens 
itself to indeterminacy and refuses to close off the enigma that gives 
freedom. The way I see things, philosophical questioning is for Heideg-
ger a radical way of questioning, i.e., it is not a questioning that seeks an 
answer that would negate the act of questioning. On the contrary, genu-
ine philosophical questioning aims at keeping the possibility of ques-
tioning open. In other words, philosophical questioning is the guardian 
of human freedom. Heidegger makes this goal explicit in his rectoral 
address when he claims that the world opened up by a return to the 
Greek experience of the impotence of our pre-modelling projection be-
fore the self-concealing totality of what is would be a world of danger 
and constant decision.70 If my reading is correct, at that time Heidegger 
conceived of philosophy as the standpoint that will bring Western 
Dasein to its proper existence and historicality by alerting it to the Des-
tiny of Being as self-withdrawal. 
3.4. The Fourth Stage 
Through my analysis of the third stage of the allegory, I have suggested 
that at that time Heidegger understands philosophical questioning as the 
pinnacle of human existence, i.e., as the standpoint that opens up Being 
without closing it off. But after raising philosophy to the highest of 
ranks in his interpretation of the third stage of the allegory, he makes 
some rather surprising claims in his discussion of the fourth stage. The 
most striking one is that, despite its liberating potential, philosophy is 
powerless when it comes to shaking the certainties of the cave-prisoners. 
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Heidegger suggests that, in order for genuine philosophy to become 
relevant, i.e., in order for the possibility of genuine liberation to emerge, 
an occurrence that shakes the complacency and self-certainty of the 
prisoners must first take place. His admission, however, that philosophy 
is powerless in the ontic realm deserves our attention, because it brings 
under new light the second stage of the allegory, namely the failed lib-
eration.  
Heidegger lingers on Plato’s claim that the philosopher liberator 
will be mocked by the prisoners and might even be killed when he re-
turns to the cave. Furthermore, he draws an explicit link between the 
impotence of philosophy and the possibility of being killed: “That the 
philosopher is delivered over to death in the cave means that philosophy 
is powerless within the region of prevailing self-evidences. Only in so 
far as these themselves change can philosophy have its say.”71 Heideg-
ger suggests that the remark about the death of the philosopher should 
not be read as a reference to the physical death of Socrates, the historical 
figure. He rather claims that death marks the fatal compromise of phi-
losophy when applied to the public realm. “The killing consists in the 
fact that the philosopher and his questioning are suddenly transferred 
into the language of the cave dwellers.”72  
Heidegger’s point is profoundly anti-Socratic. If Socrates is this 
thinker who took the risk of ridiculing himself and even of dying with 
the aim of bringing philosophical thinking to the public sphere, Heideg-
ger expresses his complete disregard for it. If philosophy is to remain 
true to itself, it must resist the public sphere. As he says, “it belongs to 
the essence of the philosopher that he is solitary […]. He is all the more 
solitary because in the cave he cannot retreat. Speaking out from soli-
tude, he speaks at the decisive moment.”73  
The portrait of the philosopher that Heidegger paints is that of a 
lonely figure that listens only to the silent call of Being, waits for the 
circumstances to change, and seizes such an opportunity in order to drag 
the cave-dwellers into the question of Being. The philosopher does not 
liberate by conversing with the cave dwellers; he “does not try to per-
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suade the cave-dwellers by reference to norms, grounds and proofs.”74 
What we encounter in Heidegger’s description of the fourth stage of the 
allegory is an irreconcilable tension between the public realm as pre-
sented at the first stage of the allegory and genuine philosophical ques-
tioning as presented at the third one. Heidegger’s account of the impo-
tence of philosophy in shaking the certainties of the prisoners suggests 
that the role of philosophy is not to problematize the certainties of the 
public sphere, but rather to lead onto the path of genuine philosophical 
questioning those who have already challenged the certainties of their 
time and find themselves in limbo. Such a claim brings under new light 
the second stage of the allegory — the so-called failed liberation.75  
Although Heidegger is adamant in claiming that freedom is not 
achieved at the second stage, the tension between the first and the third 
stage of the allegory raises the question about the link between the two 
irreconcilable realms. Heidegger’s insistence on the difference between 
the freedom achieved at the third stage and the liberation of the second 
stage does not preclude one from considering the liberation of the sec-
ond stage as a necessary — albeit insufficient — requirement for true 
freedom. As a matter of fact, what I am suggesting here is that Heideg-
ger’s remarks about the impotence of philosophy to stir up the public 
sphere, combined with his conviction that Western Dasein is in risk of 
completely forfeiting its true existence, commits Heidegger to a catas-
trophic, apocalyptic view of the way to human freedom.  
In order to better understand Heidegger’s appeal to an event that 
shakes off self-evidence as a prerequisite for the revitalization of phi-
losophy, we should return to the second stage of his interpretation of the 
allegory. At first sight, this stage merely informs us about a failed libera-
tion of the prisoners, who lacking any guidance end up willing to go 
back to what was previously self-evident. Nevertheless, the fact that in 
Heidegger’s interpretation the released prisoners find themselves en-
countering a gradation of truth indicates that at the second stage of the 
allegory, the self-certainties of the prisoners are to a certain extent 
shook. The prisoners want to return to the safety and the placidity of 
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their previous state precisely because they somehow find themselves 
liberated from it, albeit only temporarily.  
The necessity of a moment of crisis (of unshackling) for the awak-
ening of the question of Being is already apparent in Heidegger’s dis-
cussion of Angst in Being and Time. Under the fundamental mood of 
anxiety, the world — on the ground of which Dasein performs its every-
day activities — reveals itself as nothing and brings Dasein face to face 
with the question of its ownmost being and of Being in general. Never-
theless, in the early 30’s Heidegger exhibits a desire to go a step further 
and interprets the moment of crisis in terms of a historical event that 
brings not merely one Dasein, but a whole nation in front of a decision 
that will determine the future of the West.  
As we have already seen, Heidegger understands his time as a time 
of distress and confusion. Nevertheless, Heidegger is convinced that 
what is great in humans comes to fruition not in security and comfort 
but in such moments of distress and suffering. It is in such moments that 
we are called to think the depths of our historical existence. As the story 
of the wanderer indicates, the danger of dying from thirst is what makes 
us turn to the source of our historical existence. The significance that 
Heidegger ascribes to the experience of confusion, first for realizing the 
destitution of the present and then for finding a way out of destitution, 
reveals the unspoken significance of the second stage of Plato’s allegory 
for the ascent out of the forgetfulness of Being.  
In lectures given in 1934 after his resignation as Rector of 
Freiburg, Heidegger is still convinced of the significance of a historical 
crisis for the emergence of genuine questioning. Genuine questioning, 
he says, emerges out of the overpowering necessities of one’s historical 
situation.76 Although philosophy is responsible for liberating the prison-
ers toward genuine questioning, it remains hopeless with those prisoners 
that do not experience a historical crisis.  
Notwithstanding the fact that Heidegger interprets the second stage 
of the allegory as a failed liberation, his claim that philosophy is power-
less in shaking the self-evident tranquility of the prisoners indicates that 
the second stage of the allegory is not an indifferent and superfluous 
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stage. On the contrary, the failed liberation is essential for Heidegger’s 
story of an ascent toward transcendence and freedom.  
4. Conclusion  
Enough evidence emerged from the above analysis to claim the prob-
ability of a direct link between Heidegger’s political engagement and his 
interpretation of Plato’s allegory of the cave. The sharp distinction that 
Heidegger draws between the first and the third stage of the allegory, 
i.e., the sharp distinction that he draws between the public sphere, on the 
one hand, and genuine, solitary philosophical questioning, on the other, 
makes him susceptible to putting his hope in an event that cuts short all 
discussion in a violent gesture, an event that pretends to open a path to-
ward a radically different future.  
This is the point where we have to pose the question of Heideg-
ger’s engagement with National Socialism. What is the philosophical 
underpinning of Heidegger’s decision to put his faith in a regime that 
was far remote from his own philosophical concerns? I think that an an-
swer to this question can be given if we pay attention to the unbridge-
able gap that Heidegger creates between the public sphere and philoso-
phy. This gap reveals the violent and confusing dislocation of truth that 
takes place at the second stage as a necessary bridge between the two.  
I am not suggesting that Heidegger was naive enough to believe 
that National Socialism was heading toward a genuine philosophical 
questioning. What I rather want to highlight is that Heidegger’s reading 
of the allegory of the cave suggests that, in order for philosophy to re-
gain its status, it is in need of a violent exodus from the public realm — 
an exodus that philosophy itself cannot inaugurate. In other words, Hei-
degger’s perception of the public realm as irredeemably fallen together 
with his conviction that philosophy is powerless to inaugurate change at 
the ontic level commits him to the view that philosophical questioning is 
in need of an extra-philosophical thrust.  
As far as I can see, one would not be off the mark in suggesting that 
Heidegger finds in National Socialism this thrust that supposedly signals 
the end of a long tradition that has mired itself in sterile, nihilistic, and 
rootless politics. His recently published Notebooks corroborate this point. 
On the grounds of his inner conviction that his time is a time of danger, 
Heidegger interprets Hitler’s rise to power in terms of a struggle against a 
petrified status quo. But Heidegger considers such a struggle valuable 
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only to the extent that it shakes previous certainties and gives to thinking a 
new impetus. He is by no means willing to give his blessings to a new Na-
tional Socialist status quo. On the contrary, he is rather critical toward the 
slogans and catchphrases of the national socialists.77  
It is important to keep in mind that, when Heidegger says that the 
prisoners will most likely want to return to their shackles, he does not 
mean that they would want to return to the exact same shadows that they 
perceived prior to their liberation. What he rather says is that the prison-
ers will want to return to the security and the immediacy of shadows — 
whatever these shadows might be. This becomes apparent if we consider 
some of his remarks in the Black Notebooks regarding the danger that 
National Socialism will become a new status quo. 
National Socialism is a genuine nascent power only if it still has something to 
withhold behind all its activity and talk — and only if it operates as strongly 
holding back and in that way has effectivity into the future. But if the present 
were already that which is to be attained and striven for, then only a dread of 
the downfall would be left over.78 
The solidification of a national socialist actuality, with its own slo-
gans and catchphrases, would mark for Heidegger the forfeiting of the 
great chance to reawaken the question of Being and with it the historical 
essence of Western Dasein. It seems that the above-quoted passage from 
the Black Notebooks should be read together with Heidegger’s interpre-
tation of the allegory of the cave. Heidegger clearly sees a prospect in 
National Socialism. Nevertheless, he also makes clear that this prospect 
could easily go down the drain. To be more precise, the prospect of Na-
tional Socialism depends on whether it will realize the innermost danger 
of the time or not. Not to realize this danger is for Heidegger to forfeit 
the prospect of the movement. Heidegger understands National Social-
ism as a movement that emerges out of historical necessity (the destitu-
tion of the West) and has the potential to bring the German people in 
front of a decision that will either liberate them or plunge them into the 
most dreadful downfall.  
National Socialism carries, according to Heidegger, both a promise 
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and a threat. On the one hand, the promising prospect of National So-
cialism is that it may bring the German people back to their historical 
existence. The dangerous prospect, on the other hand, is that National 
Socialism may forfeit its liberating possibility and end up becoming a 
new certainty. But, if we go back to Heidegger’s interpretation of the al-
legory of the cave, we are reminded that this dual possibility of decision 
and flight from decision opens up at the second stage of the allegory. As 
we have seen, the liberated prisoners of the second stage encounter the 
possibility of a decision from which they will most likely flee in search 
of the security of their imprisoned state. In doing so, they decide not to 
decide.79  
Given the above, one can securely say that Heidegger finds in Na-
tional Socialism the embodiment of a struggle against the certainties of 
his time that prohibit genuine philosophical questioning. Heidegger’s 
idiosyncratic National Socialism boils down to his attempt to reawaken 
a genuine philosophical questioning, which he links to the essence of 
human existence as transcendence. The struggle that National Socialism 
embodies in Heidegger’s eyes could be transformed — provided that it 
does not lose its way — to a struggle against the oblivion of Being.  
The emergence of National Socialism marks for Heidegger a sud-
den liberation accompanied by perplexity and insecurity. One way of 
proceeding from there is to attempt to create new certainties, i.e., to at-
tempt to create a new status quo. Continuing with the analogy between 
Heidegger’s National Socialism and his interpretation of the allegory, it 
can be said that the emergence of a new status quo would mark for Hei-
degger a return to the shackled state, where what appears is taken un-
questionably as true. This way of proceeding constitutes for Heidegger a 
failed liberation since the possibility of posing the question of the es-
sence of truth and the truth of Being is completely lost, and this is for 
Heidegger the innermost danger of his time. Another way of proceeding 
is that of engaging into questioning the essence of truth and thus intensi-
fying uncertainty.80  
If my interpretation is correct, National Socialism marks for Hei-
degger the moment of a sudden liberation that nevertheless fails to guar-
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80 See Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” 474. 
32 SOFIA PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 
antee a genuine liberation. National Socialism is an event in history that, 
if it is to fulfill its mission, must bring the Germans in front of a crucial 
decision: either to return to a restrictive understanding of truth and Be-
ing or to engage in genuine questioning.81 It is important, however, not 
to take the above concession apologetically. As Tracy Strong insight-
fully notices, Heidegger’s insistence on the violent path of liberation is 
not unrelated to the violence of the National Socialist regime.82 The vio-
lence of the new regime that shakes off the self-certainties of the cave-
dwellers is tacitly preferable, for Heidegger, to standstill, equilibrium, 
mediocrity, harmlessness, etc., which he considers as symptoms of the 
oblivion of Being.83 One cannot fail to notice that Heidegger’s under-
standing of tranquility and harmlessness as symptoms of the oblivion of 
Being tells us something about his understanding of the events of his 
time. Since tranquility and harmlessness signal the oblivion of Being, 
tension, crisis, and even suffering can be understood as harbingers of a 
renewed relationship to Being.  
It is quite interesting to notice that Heidegger’s critique of the Na-
tional Socialist regime — notwithstanding the fact that it is to be found 
quite early in his Notebooks — is limited only to these elements (Nazi 
dogmatism, spiritual apathy, mediocrity, etc.) that betray a perversion of 
the highest aim of renewing the question of Being.84 The only thing that 
interests Heidegger is to guide the impetus of the new regime toward 
genuine philosophical questioning. All actual suffering seems to be, for 
him, nothing compared to the suffering that a complete oblivion of Be-
ing would bring.  
                                           
81 The new truth that National Socialism is striving for is therefore relevant for 
Heidegger only to the extent that it shakes previous truths. The new truth is 
merely a step toward decision; the decision to either open up a radically other 
future or close off the future by insisting on the absoluteness of this new truth.  
82 See Tracy B. Strong, Politics without Vision: Thinking without a Banister in the 
Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 311. 
83 Heidegger, Being and Truth, 74.  
84 Heidegger, Ponderings II-VI, 94, 112, 119.  
